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| INTRODUCTION
"Cultural attraction theory" (CAT) or "cultural epidemiology" began and developed alongside powerful criticisms of replication-based theories of social transmission and learning. [1] [2] [3] [4] Since then, CAT has produced a steady trickle of papers that runs alongside a growing cottage industry of cultural evolutionary research. In their article, 9 Thom
Scott-Phillips, Stefaan Blancke, and Christophe Heintz (hereafter, "the authors"), do a commendable job summarizing CAT research, articulating the theoretical framework, clearing up points of confusion, and noting areas of continued disagreement. This is valuable work.
Despite being a mature statement of CAT research, however, the authors' article does not address a serious and longstanding problem for the framework: that it appears to lack tools for generating "explanations of intermediate generality-a level between grand theory and particular cases." 5 (p. 848) . This problem has dogged CAT from its earliest presentations to the present day. [5] [6] [7] [8] Yet the authors seem not to feel its bite. I think this is unfortunate. My hunch is that while the misunderstandings discussed by the authors are genuine, they are symptoms resulting from this deeper issue.
| CAUSAL EXCESS AND CAT
As the authors suggest, CAT's approach to cultural evolution involves three projects. One is descriptive: the characterization of statistical tendencies toward stabilization in form or frequency of cultural traits, what they call cultural attractors. The other two are empirical and explanatory: identifying and characterizing the casual patterns underpinning cultural attractors ('factors of attraction') and explaining how these "shape and stabilize cultural items." 9 (p. 171)
Clear enough. But how are researchers to achieve these aims, given the extravagant number of causes at work in cultural change? The size of social networks, the availability of resources, the difficulty of the task environment, the beliefs of the local polity-all of these and more besides will jointly determine the spread and stability of culture. Given this causal profusion, researchers require more than clearly articulated aspirations; they need principles and methods for determining what causal processes are likely to be salient in any given case, understanding the general applicability and dynamics of these processes, and aggregating these together to produce satisfying explanations.
These problems bedevil all cultural evolutionary researchers.
Most, however, adopt a strategy of idealization, focusing on selected features of transmission, accumulation, modification, or the like. [10] [11] [12] [13] CAT adopts a different tack. Especially when characterizing their theoretical framework, they embrace causal excess. 1, 14 The authors'
paper is case-in-point. As they write, the causal processes targeted by CAT include "cognitive competencies, preferences, and dispositions and also both currently and previously held beliefs, acquired skills, know-how, memories and other psychological phenomena" 9 (p. 167),
together with a range of ecological factors of attraction that operate at broader or narrower spatiotemporal scales, for example:
"The rotation of the Earth is a global ecological factor, which has a clear causal influence on, among other things, the meaning of the word "day." The prevalence of a particular plant species in the local environment is a local ecological factor (which can influence, for instance, local medicinal techniques)" 9 (p. 168)
While it is right to think that explanations of cultural diversity require the consideration of a wide variety of causal influences, it is not clear that the CAT framework provides sufficient guidance for researchers to gain purchase on their empirical and explanatory aims. theory, [10] [11] [12] [13] 18 to mathematical sociology, 19, 20 to name just a few-this gives few reasons to think that, as they stand, the theoretical resources of CAT are particularly useful for cultural evolutionary research.
| THE MODULAR BET
Of course, this is not to say that proponents of CAT fail to make empirical generalizations, or even "empirically vulnerable claims" Among these factors, it prefers to focus on the most general-the most robust and least variable aspects of emotions, memory, perception, and so on." 21 
(p. 155)
This is a sensible way of solving problems of salience, generalization, and aggregation. Frameworks and narratives concerning human psychology, particularly its evolutionary history, are useful sources for hypothesistesting and modeling, as other cultural evolutionary work confirms.
11-13,22
The CAT-influenced strategy is distinctive. It zooms in on a particular set of cultural evolutionary phenomena and adopts an idiosyncratic evolutionary framing. The phenomena it focuses on are those with a certain amount of interpretive latitude. This because CAT researchers believe that learning involves reconstructive inferences, that the inferential processes at work in this reconstructive process are potential targets for evolution by natural selection, and because the effect of such inferences are best seen in situations with a wide range of possible variants.
1,2,8,23
The evolutionary framing appeals to innate "modules"; special-purpose deep cognitive structures such as face recognition modules, 24 capacities for folk taxonomic reasoning, 25 or just loosely characterized "universal Let me sum up. The modular bet represents a sensible if highly contentious and constrained methodology for guiding empirical research. I take it that the CAT-influenced case studies discussed or referenced by the authors-the direction of eye-gaze in portraiture, 36 the diversity in religious concepts, 37 or the spread of "composite" animals (like chimera) 25 -represent scenarios where the bet generates useful hypotheses for investigation and debate. But as mentioned above, it is important to note that the modular bet borrows little from the CAT framework. Though these researchers may nod toward CAT or "cultural epidemiology" in their work, the empirical and explanatory burden is placed squarely on evolutionary hunches that are conceptually and theoretically distinct from the CAT framework.
| MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN THE MIDDLE GROUND
I have not said much about the authors' four misunderstandings. This is because, for the most part, I find them unobjectionable. The authors are right that other cultural evolutionary researchers have made interpretive blunders when attempting to critique or build upon CAT work.
Yet I see these as superficial. There appear to be few empirical details that hang on correcting the authors' misunderstandings-aside from the now well-known issues with models that treat social transmission as akin to copying. 
